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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper argues that institutional process are essential to the execution of economic 
policy. In the absence of adequate institutional processes, well-intentioned economic 
policies may not be implemented in the manner expected by theory. The case of 
privatisation in Malaysia is used as an example to illustrate why institutional processes 
must be put into place in order to achieve the full benefit of economic policies. Economic 
theory suggests that privatisation, rather than state-ownership of enterprises, leads to 
greater economic efficiency. However, this is only the case if privatisation initiatives are 
carried out in a manner that consistent with good institutional practice. This paper 
suggests that there is a prima facie case for establishing transparent institutions in order 
to gain from the proper implementation of economic policy.  
 
Keywords: privatisation policy, institutional process, Malaysian economic policy 
implementation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The microeconomic foundations of economies ensure that macroeconomic 
objectives are achieved. Stated differently, macroeconomic goals can only be 
achieved if there are robust institutions ensuring that microeconomic policies are 
designed, executed and monitored in accordance with the principles of 
transparency and good governance. Institutional strategies are not usually given a 
place of prominence in debates on national economic growth. Indeed, the 
importance of institutions is usually given a back seat and labelled as a 'soft' 
issue. In fact, as this paper will argue, the lack of a clear institutional framework 
may possibly have robbed Malaysia's privatisation drive of its full effectiveness.   
 
The privatisation initiative in Malaysia was introduced at the correct juncture in 
the country's development. It is undeniable that the basis for privatisation was in 
keeping with current economic thinking. The rationale for privatisation is based 
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on the premise that governments should restrict themselves to governing and not 
venture into running businesses. There are several reasons for this argument, 
including the undesirability of a large bureaucracy, the inefficiencies of 
centralised planning and the crowding-out of private investment. The 
implementation of privatisation could be undertaken in such a manner as to 
undermine the benefits that would otherwise accrue. The proper conduct of 
privatisation requires that efficiency and transparency should be considered in the 
implementation process. Otherwise, the outcomes might not be efficient and there 
will be an associated welfare loss.  
 
The implementation of privatisation requires that proper institutions be 
established in order to avoid practices that will result in inefficiencies and welfare 
losses. The implementation of privatisation in Malaysia may well have suffered 
from the lack of a well-defined institutional framework. Had such a framework 
been established prior to the execution of privatisation, many of the flaws in the 
implementation phase could have been avoided. The absence of any 
consideration for institutions that could have overseen the execution of 
privatisation led to the inappropriate implementation.  
 
This paper will be organised as follows. The second section will consider the 
increasing importance that has been attached to institutions, and areas in need 
attention within the process of institutional reform. The third section will discuss 
how the government planned for privatisation. We argue that privatisation was a 
part of the country's planning process but that institutional elements were 
ignored. The section that follows will highlight the practice of privatisation in 
Malaysia, demonstrating the incidence of disregard for institutional processes. 
The improper execution of privatisation in the health care industry will be 
discussed in this context. The fifth section will discuss the issues of institutional 
reform in the case of the telecommunications sector. We will highlight the need 
to establish an independent body to oversee institutional reform. Finally, some 
concluding remarks are offered. 
 
 
ESTABLISHING INSTITUTIONAL REFORM 
 
There is a recognition that textbook principles of microeconomics take the 
presence of institutions for granted. Rodrik (1999) admitted in his research, that 
"the broader point that markets need to be supported by non-market institutions in 
order to perform well took a while to sink in". Indeed, for long much of 
neoclassical economic theory has historically paid scant attention to the role of 
institutions.1 Rodrik (1999) draws from general equilibrium theory to note that 
the Arrow-Debreu model "seems to require no assistance from non-market 
institutions".  
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In fact, the interest in institutions has motivated empirical work on institutions 
and their contribution to the improvement of aggregate incomes (Acemoglu, 
Johnson & Robinson, 2001; Easterly & Levine, 2003). Various institutions are 
considered necessary for economic growth, such as property rights, regulatory 
institutions, institutions for macroeconomic stabilisation, institutions for social 
insurance and institutions for conflict management (Rodrik, 1999). Rodrik (1999) 
emphatically states that participatory political regimes deliver higher-quality 
growth. 
 
Good microeconomic policy would seek to ensure competition. Indeed, one of 
the principal objectives in undertaking privatisation would be to ensure that the 
government does not crowd out the market and that privatisation increases 
competition in the provision of goods and services. The purpose of any 
regulatory agency is to ensure that competition is protected. It then follows that 
particular suppliers of goods and services should not receive any specific 
protection. The intention of any regulatory agency would be to ensure that 
competition is allowed to prevail in the market without distortion or intervention, 
either from an external source (such as the government) or from within (more 
powerful firms in the market).  
 
The overall principle at stake is competition. Regulatory bodies must ensure that 
competition, rather than specific competitors, is protected.2 With this idea 
forming the backdrop to policy-making, the overall welfare of society must be 
given due consideration rather than the interests of particular sectors or groups. 
Broadly, the intention of any microeconomic policy (and by extension, of any 
regulatory body), should be to safeguard the principle of attaining the highest 
possible welfare for the economy as a whole.  
 
There are often various issues at stake and these matters go beyond the ambit of 
competition or efficiency. Among such issues is the safeguarding of health and 
safety standards. It is equally important to overcome income inequalities and 
regional disparities. It is not always appropriate for the government to intervene, 
but it is also not always appropriate to leave matters to be resolve by the market 
itself. This again creates a strong argument for a relevant regulatory agency that 
could make independent assessments of the private sector and the government. 
Such an agency could make recommendations on policy design and provide ex-
ante evaluation prior to policy implementation. As expected, the agency would 
follow up with an ex-post evaluation at a reasonable period after the introduction 
of the policy measure in question. 
 
Having argued that there are a number of considerations that need to be taken 
into account in devising policy, we note that it is essential to determine the 
significance and risk associated with certain events. These factors call for an 
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independent agency that could advise the government and the public at large on 
the efficiency and welfare outcomes of policy devices. Clearly, this proposal 
hinges on the need for institutional reform, particularly in a country like 
Malaysia.3  
 
We would argue that good regulation would be achieved if the following criteria 
were to be satisfied:4 
 
 i.  Transparency.  
  It should be clear how a certain policy was decided up. Further, the 
processes entailed by this policy should be open to all stakeholders. 
Finally, information should be made available to concerned parties 
without undue restriction. 
 
ii.  Costs and benefits.  
  The cost and benefit considerations underlying any policy initiative 
should be made clear. The costs and benefits accruing to alternative 
policies should be clearly laid out to all stakeholders. 
 
iii.  Performance criteria.  
  There should be clear criteria for judging performance, which should be 
used to judge the effectiveness of the policy as well as the parties 
involved in the delivery of the policy. This will enable the clear and fair 
audit of policy initiatives and effectively assess the performance of 
agents/agencies involved in implementing the policies. 
 
iv. Process and organisational flow.  
The manner of instituting policies and the institutions and processes 
involved should be clearly linked, showing the interdependences between 
agents, their lines of connection and responsibilities.  
 
Two critical points must be seriously considered in formulating good regulation. 
First, the entire process should be transparent. Second, the regulatory process 
should work towards achieving efficiency or an adequate balance of competing 
government goals, as the case may be. While the question of balance in the 
presence of competing goals is problematic, we argue that transparency in 
addition to defendable structures and processes ensure that acceptable solutions 
may be derived.  
 
In discussing the form that a stylised policy development process could take, Dee 
(2006) noted the necessity of several stages. Dee's scheme started with problem 
identification, extended to agency review, and resulted in a consultation process 
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with stakeholders in the economy. This is followed by a report that is prepared by 
the concerned agency and submitted to the relevant Minister. The Minister would 
then discuss the matter, before legislation and regulation processed are tabled. 
 
The policy process in Malaysia deeply lacks some of the elements of 'good' 
regulation that we have been describing. While the practice of privatisation was, 
in essence and in principle, appropriate for Malaysia, execution was flawed due 
to a lack of the right institutions. The fundamental flaw, as we shall discover in 
subsequent sections, was the absence of appropriate institutions to guarantee that 
privatisation was carried out efficiently and effectively. Indeed, even the central 
documents that were released prior to privatisation exercise listed the goals, but 
were largely silent on the institutions necessary for the successful implementation 
of privatisation.  
 
Transparency is the most pressing issue that must be accommodated within the 
institutional structure of policy process in Malaysia. This would have to be 
incorporated at all levels of the policy process, starting with problem 
identification, going through cost-benefit analysis (CBA) calculations and 
reaching the point of describing the projected outcomes from alternative 
scenarios. Obviously, there should be transparency in the implementation of the 
policy process, which would imply transparency in public procurement, open 
discussions of shortcomings in implementation and clear admissions of failure in 
the delivery of the policies. 
 
The second area that demands attention is the assessment and review process. 
Presently, there is no clear process through which assessments and evaluations 
are carried out. Private consultants are engaged on occasion, but the process is 
otherwise executed internally. In both cases, the independence of the assessment 
process comes under question. It would be preferable to have an independent 
body that could conduct CBA studies, design policies and review outcomes once 
the proposed policies have been implemented. A possible model for such a body 
the Australian Productivity Commission. It is still possible to consider the 
opinions of private consultants and internal assessments, and such comparisons 
should indeed be discussed in parliament. Without doubt, discussions based on 
views from various sources would add to the richness of debate and allow the 
parliament to make better-informed decisions. 
 
Finally, it is necessary to institute an agency that could monitor and report on the 
organisational aspects of the policy process. The ministries for their respective 
policy implementation would monitor those aspects that are related to the 
implementation of a policy. The function of monitoring would ensure the 
followings:  
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i. Routines in policy executing follow recommended flows and 
organisational structures;  
ii. Lines of responsibility are adhered to; 
iii. Implementation flaws are detected and improvement are advised on; and 
iv. Recommended procedures and standards are followed. 
 
Since claims of mismanagement and poor governance can arise, it follows that an 
independent monitoring agency should be established. This monitoring agency 
will observe the implementation of policies and observe non-compliance with 
suggested guidelines; it will also recommend how inefficiencies in the operation 
of policy implementation could be improved.  
 
In institutional terms, the limiting factors to the Malaysian policy process come 
from three possible sources: 
 
i. Inadequate exposure to regulatory best practice; 
ii. Vested interests that impede good regulatory practice; and 
iii. Rent-seeking behaviour by the government. 
 
The first issue corresponds to the economic culture that prevails in Malaysia and 
is symptomatic of most developing countries: there is no definite agreement on 
what constitutes good regulatory practice. Essentially, this relates to a poor 
theoretical understanding of what constitutes best practice, particularly with 
regard to institutional structures that must be established and maintained to 
ensure that policy process seek to achieve the highest possible social welfare for 
the economy, viewed as a whole.  
 
The second constraint arises due to vested interests that, in their attempt to 
achieve their own goals, disrupt the efficient functioning of good regulatory 
practice. Here, we assume that the government itself does not actively support 
events that are detrimental to the efficient functioning of institutional processes 
and agencies, but is rather obstructed by firms and individuals who attempt to 
violate good practices for their own gains. In effect, this is caused by firms and 
individuals, without government complicity, who attempt to induce corruption or 
use personal influence and power so that institutional processes are made 
malleable to achieve individual gains.  
 
Finally, the possibility of the government using its own offices in order to obtain 
rent would be the most difficult to contain. Indeed, one often reads reports of this 
practice occurring in developing countries, particularly after a change in regime.  
Transparency is most important in his category, yet is typically absent. It has 
been alleged that the primary problem with the privatisation exercise in Malaysia 
was largely due to the government overlooking this source of difficulty. 
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PLANNING FOR PRIVATISATION 
 
The privatisation wave in Malaysia had its beginnings in 1983, when then Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohamad publicised his government's intention to embark on 
a privatisation policy. This was followed by the publication of Privatisation 
Guidelines by the Economic Planning Unit (EPU) of the Prime Minister's 
Department in 1985. These guidelines constituted the official document on 
privatisation. In February 1991, the Privatisation Masterplan (PMP) was 
announced. This plan set out the country's privatisation policies.  
 
In formulating its privatisation policy, the government aimed to achieve the 
following objectives: 
 
i. To relieve the financial and administrative burden of the government; 
ii. To improve efficiency and increase productivity;  
iii. To facilitate economic growth; 
iv. To reduce the size and presence of the public sector in the economy; and 
v. To assist in meeting the national development policy targets. 
 
In tandem with the PMP, the government introduced the Privatisation Action 
Plan (PAP),5 a two-year rolling plan to assist in implementation. The PAP was 
reviewed annually with a view to identify measures to expedite the 
implementation of the programme and to determine the entities to be privatised in 
the following two years. The PAP was guided by a study undertaken by private 
consultants who were commissioned by the government to review the 
advisability of privatising government-owned entities (GOEs).  
 
The government at that time, did institute a plan for privatisation. The PMP did 
define its objectives clearly; it also identified the activities that were to be 
privatised. The PMP did rank the priority by which projects were to be privatised, 
indicating those that were of national importance. The PAP outlined an 
implementation pathway (as mentioned, implementation did not refer to 
institutional processes and regulatory frameworks). The PAP was instead, 
concerned with the different categories of activities to be privatised6 and the 
methods for restructuring non-profitable companies. This document also outlined 
the stages in the implementation of privatisation.7 
 
The execution of privatisation would have achieved more efficiency if there were 
an institutional structure that ensured the conduct of transparency. Transparency, 
in this context, would have been broad-ranging enough to encompass other 
considerations. We have identified transparency, disclosure of costs and benefits, 
performance criteria, process and organisational flow as elements of good 
regulation. The PMP or PAP should have addressed these issues explicitly. As we 
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shall see in the following section, the failure to do so led to the flawed 
implementation of several privatisation projects. 
 
Arguably, the most crucial of the elements suggested is transparency. Other 
aspects would have been achieved if transparency had been emphasised, because 
insistence on transparency would require disclosure on CBA, methods of 
evaluation, and a clear description of the agents involved. On a macro level, the 
privatisation of particular projects should be defended through CBA results. This 
should be followed by the enunciation of a clear set of goals and the proposed 
evaluatory framework. On a more micro level, an adequate institutional process 
would require transparency in the selection and award of contracts to the selected 
companies. Execution of the privatisation plan was because it did not explicitly 
accommodate institutional processes. 
 
 
PRIVATISATION OF HEALTH SUPPORT SERVICES 
 
The government has long been the provider for health services in Malaysia. In the 
pre-privatisation era, the government engaged itself in the entire gamut of health 
care, from public health to preventive medicines and including curative and 
rehabilitative care. The first slivers of privatisation occurred in the early 1990s, 
when the government decided to privatise non-medical services only, excluding 
core medical functions and services. In 1994, the Ministry of Health divested its 
pharmaceutical store and services, which was followed by the oursourcing of 
hospital support services in 1996 and the privatisation of health examination of 
foreign workers in 1997.  
 
The privatisation of the health support services in Malaysia was part of the larger 
attempt to launch privatisation in the health sector and to liberalise the sector.8 
The objective, ostensibly, was to improve economic efficiency in the health 
sector. These developments also coincided with the Ministry of Health's plan to 
privatise clinical waste management services since public hospitals did not 
appear to have adequate facilities. Two developments were wrestling for the 
attention of the government: the increasing costs of providing medical care, and 
the burden of providing a wide range of services for the public in connection with 
administrative, support, medical and preventive services. The government's 
responses to these problems were twofold. First, it decided to concentrate on its 
core health services and privatise other activities within the health sector. Second, 
the government was convinced that it would continue maintaining its 
commitment to civil servants and the deprived. In consonance with these views, 
the government chose to privatise non-core activities and to liberalise the health 
sector. The latter implied that the private sector was encouraged to provide health 
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care (which would lead to the opening of private hospitals) to cater to those who 
could afford more expensive health care and medical treatment.  
 
Consequently, in 1993, the government began to privatise the health support 
services (HSS), calling for open tenders in July 1993. Thirty-one companies 
(both local and foreign) participated in the tender process, with the EPU and the 
Privatisation Task Force (PTF) overseeing the process. Before contracts were 
awarded, three private companies submitted their respective proposals to the EPU 
on the basis of recommendations made by their consultants. Several meetings 
were held between EPU, the Ministry of Health and the three companies before 
reaching an agreement on the mode of privatisation. The three companies—Faber 
Medi-Serve Sdn. Bhd., Radicare (M) Sdn. Bhd. and Pantai Medivest Sdn. Bhd.—
discussed the formulation of the Concession Agreement (Noorul, unpublished) 
and were allocated regions over which they had control over the market. Faber 
Medi-Serve was given the Northern Zone of Malaysia and East Malaysia, 
Radicare had responsibility over the Central and Eastern Zones and Pantai was 
required to cover the Southern Zone. This process of allocation had the effect 
made the three companies monopolies in their allocated regions. Two striking of 
observations must be made about the companies that were selected to provide the 
HSS. None of the firms had a background on the provision of the services that 
they were supposed to provide. Furthermore, all three companies had to undergo 
a restructuring process subsequent to the 1998 economic crisis due to 
mismanagement.  
 
The following are some of the key areas that were privatised by the Ministry of 
Health: 
 
i. Supply of pharmaceutical services; 
ii. Supply of hospital support services; 
iii. Monitoring and consultancy services; and 
iv. Monitoring and supervision of foreign workers health certification. 
 
The supply of pharmaceutical services was contracted to Pharmaniaga Logistics, 
a private limited company. Pharmaniaga received a concession period of                  
15 years, the strength length of most other services contracted to private 
companies. It was agreed that the government would make purchases from 
Pharmaniaga at an agreed price that would be re-negotiated every two years. No 
single body would act as a regulatory authority. Instead, the purchase of 
pharmaceutical products, services pricing and other arrangements were regulated 
jointly by the National Pharmaceutical Bureau, the Ministry of Health and the 
Price Committee.  
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The supply of hospital support services was contracted to two private limited 
companies, Pantai Medivest and Faber Mediserve. The concession period for 
these companies was 15 years, with the government purchasing the supply of 
hospital support services at an agreed price named in the Concession Agreement. 
It was decided that Kawalselia, the Fee Review Committee and the Ministry of 
Health act together to regulate the purchase, price and quality of the services 
provided. The supply of monitoring and consultancy services was contracted out 
to SIHAT for a concession period of 5 years. For hospital support services, the 
agencies were involved in regulation with the exception of the Fee Committee, 
which was not involved in the supply of monitoring and consultancy services. 
The financing mechanism was similar to that adopted for the supply of hospital 
support services, with payments being made by the government based on services 
provided at the agreed rate. No single body acted as a regulatory authority. The 
monitoring and supervision of the health certification of foreign workers was 
privatised to FOMEMA and regulated by the Disease Control Division and the 
Ministry of Health. Financing in this case was borne entirely by foreign workers. 
  
The concession agreement that was extended to the firms involved in 
privatisation covered important elements relating to scope of service, quality and 
the like. For instance, indicators listed the expected technical requirements and 
performance standards. The Master Agreed Procedures (MAP) listed the 
practices and procedures to be followed. A hospital-specific implementation plan 
was designed to ensure that technical requirements, performance indicators, and 
required practices and procedures were operationalised in hospitals. A quality 
assurance programme was instituted to ensure that key performance indicators 
were satisfied. In all these respects, there is no doubt that the government tried to 
safeguard the operational efficiency and quality of service offered in the 
hospitals. There were other areas in which the privatisation process had room for 
improvement and are still in need of correction because they hinder economic 
efficiency within the system. 
 
It is necessary to outline the regulatory framework as conceived and implemented 
by the government before delving into a critical analysis of the regulatory system 
used in the privatisation of HSS. As mentioned, the concession agreement was 
collectively determined with the participation of the companies that were 
awarded the contracts. The efficacy of such a practice is questionable. The 
supervisory system that was devised is equally questionable.   
 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) established Kawalselia (or the regulatory unit) 
with the express intention of supervising and monitoring the activities of 
concessionaires to ensure that their services were in accordance with the 
requirements stipulated in the Concession Agreement (CA). Kawalselia was 
responsible for monitoring the activities of contractors, providing technical 
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advice and approving consumables and procedures. On the other hand, SIHAT 
(or the Hospital System for the Monitoring of Standards) directly monitors the 
performance of contractors and advises the MoH as to whether contractors are 
fulfilling their obligations as stipulated in the Concession Agreement. SIHAT 
acts as an independent inspector and auditor of standards, providing input for 
Kawalselia and hospital directors in all hospitals where contractors have been 
hired.  
 
First, the manner in which Kawalselia and SIHAT were instituted is subject to 
criticism. Kawalselia was operational in 1998, about a year after the privatisation 
of HSS. It is unacceptable that there was no institutional structure in place prior 
to the launching of privatisation. Even more objectionable is the fact that 
Kawalselia, the regulatory unit, had only eight staff members and was 
insufficiently equipped to supervise its purported objective, the privatisation of 
HSS. Another supervisory and audit company was formed in order to correct this 
deficiency in the functioning of Kawalselia. This company, SIHAT, was meant to 
act as an external monitoring and evaluation agency. SIHAT was expected to 
monitor and supervise the contractors, and to use their input to provide advisory 
services to the Engineering Services Division of the MoH. Two observations 
arise from this arrangement. First, the MoH did not seem to anticipate the need 
for a regulatory unit while the privatisation initiative was being implemented. 
Second, it is questionable to appoint a regulatory company that lacks the essential 
capabilities required to perform the designated function. Finally, the appointment 
of an advisory company (SIHAT, in this case) to oversee another company (i.e., 
Kawalselia) promotes an overlap in function, which creates more friction and 
unnecessarily raises regulatory costs.  
 
As we can see, the government and the Ministry of Health in particular, lacked a 
clear understanding of institutional structures and regulatory reform during the 
privatisation efforts. There is no doubt that privatisation was, in theory, a 
necessary step in the development of health services in the country, but the 
manner in which the privatisation initiative was exercised raises serious questions 
on the efficacy of institutional strategies undertaken by the government. In fact, 
the manner in which the microeconomic reform was carried out indicated a lack 
of understanding of institutional reform. To undertake privatisation without the 
necessary institutional infrastructure weakened the potential gains of 
privatisation. To invite privatisation bids from firms with no prior experience in a 
particular sector raises questions about the selection of such concessionaries. If 
there was a specific reason why firms without an industry track record were 
entrusted with the privatisation effort, then a transparent display of selection 
criteria should have been made public. Equally, the government should have 
publicised the standing of other bidding firms and explained why some firms 
were chosen over others. Clearly, well-designed institutional policy and 
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appropriate institutional structures and processes should have been developed 
ahead of the privatisation effort and thereafter followed in order to maximise 
social welfare. 
 
Lopez's (2005) studied on the privatisation of HSS revealed that contractors did 
not have well-trained staff for clinical waste management. The hospitals also 
experienced problems with waste separation. Problems of a different sort were 
experienced in the case of cleaning services because staff members were 
incapable of following guidelines and procedures, particularly when handling 
hazardous and potentially risky situations. Another problem is that planned 
preventive maintenance is not conducted in a scheduled manner and the 
monitoring of equipment does not follow prescribed guidelines. Finally, Lopez 
(2005) noted that SIHAT based its evaluation on complaints from hospital staff. 
This is an inadequate system because the hospital staff is not aware of the 
conditions that contractors are expected to satisfy or of the nature of the 
contracts. Further, HSS contractors are known to develop relationships with 
hospital staff in order to influence their judgements.  
 
Several, comments must be made on institutional arrangements in the context of 
the privatisation of HSS. First, the scenario that has been painted regarding the 
privatisation of HSS clearly suggests that there is a need for a regulatory 
authority with overarching control over public agencies (public hospitals, in this 
case). Second, this regulatory agency must be independent in order to remain 
effective, and it should be free from the intervention of its respective ministers. 
While final decisions should be made at the discretion of ministers, the counsel 
received from independent regulatory bodies should be transparent and free from 
government interference. The absence of such a body could prevent some of the 
inconsistencies found in the HSS case, such as the ad hoc appointment of audit 
companies lacking requisite expertise, inadequate evaluating systems and the 
absence of transparency. An independent authority would have noted that the fee 
review process outlined in the CA had not been revised since the onset of the 
agreement. This authority would also have drawn attention to the fact that HSS 
costs are increasing (exceeding RM700 million at present) and would have 
ensured that contractors were appointed on a transparent basis. These factors 
decidedly point to the urgent need of independent regulatory bodies in the health 
sector.     
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REFORMING REGULATION 
 
Preliminary Efforts at Reform: The Telecommunications Industry 
 
The privatisation of the telecommunications industry is an interesting case for 
study because it has historically been very much under the wings of the 
government. Secondly, the privatisation of telecommunications involved 
institutional reform, albeit in an inadequate manner. The first move in 
telecommunications reform was to permit the private sector to supply 
telecommunications equipment (such as telephones and teleprinters), an activity 
that had been entirely within the province of Jabatan Telekommunikasi Malaysia 
(JTM) or the Malaysian Telecommunications Department. The private sector was 
allowed to participate in this line of activity because JTM was unable to meet the 
demand for such equipment, and the government thought that the inclusion of the 
private sector was a way of overcoming the problem of excess demand. This 
move was the start of a series of efforts to liberalise the telecommunications 
sector. With the privatisation of terminal equipment in 1983, VANs were 
liberalised in 1984, which was quickly followed by the liberalisation of the radio 
paging and mobile cellular markets in 1985 and 1988, respectively. 
 
The liberalisation of pockets of the telecommunications sector ultimately led to 
the takeover of JTM by Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Berhad (STM) in 1987. A 
public listing of STM took place in 1999, and STM was renamed Telekom 
Malaysia Berhad (TMB). Despite this privatisation bid, the government continues 
to hold substantial shares (no less than 60%) in TMB's equity. Liberalisation has 
required entry into the fixed line and cellular services markets. The fixed line 
market has been more or less immune to penetration since the costs of building a 
fixed line are prohibitively high new entrants. While at least five licenses have 
been issued to new entrants into the fixed line market, it seems inconceivable that 
TMB's market share in this area will be contested to any significant degree. 
 
The situation is quite different in the cellular phone services market since the 
barriers to entry are less stringent. The first cellular phone license was issued to 
NMT450 in 1984, followed by one to STM Cellular Communications in 1988. 
STM sold its shares in the latter company, after which the company was called 
Celcom Sdn Bhd. The leading competitors in the cellular market include TMB, 
Mobikom, Celcom, Maxis, DiGi and TIME dotCom. Similarly, the internet 
service provider (ISP) market has been liberalised following the initial internet 
service that was first provided by MIMOS, a government-owned research 
institute. Other licensees in the market include TMB, TIME, Maxis and Celcom.  
Several other companies, such as Mutiara and Prismanet, have licenses to offer 
ISP services. With this brief overview of the telecommunications industry, we 
now proceed to an examination of the regulatory framework. 
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Until 1987, the telecommunications sector was regulated by the Ministry of 
Energy, Telecommunications and Posts (METP). While METP assumed 
responsibility over the granting of licenses, JTM continued to provide 
telecommunications services. Thus, JTM acted on instructions received from 
METP. The Telecommunications Act of 1950 made JTM the regulatory authority 
for this sector. With the passing of the Telecommunications Service (Successor 
Company) Act of 1985, STM was provided with the authority to take over 
telecommunications services from JTM.  
 
The National Telecommunications Policy (NTP) (Ministry of Energy, 
Telecommunications and Posts, 1994), which was released in 1994, is an 
important benchmark in the development of the regulatory framework for the 
sector. The NTP was aimed at covering broad policy directions governing the 
sector for the period 1994–2020. The main thrust of the NTP was to "encourage 
competition in the telecommunications sector in order to achieve efficiency and 
to provide excellent and quality service" (NTP, 1994). This proclaimed interest in 
encouraging competition was not the sole or overriding objective of the NTP. In 
fact, the government retained the right to intervene, and the NTP expressly 
endows the government with authority to determine the number of competitors in 
the sector. There seems to be a contradiction between the idea that competition is 
the primary objective and the government's function as an arbitrator that is 
"empowered to determine the number of competitors that are economically viable 
for certain telecommunication systems/services" (NTP, 1994). The problem 
arising here is the question of the government's independence and impartiality in 
determining the number of competitors, and how this function will be tempered 
by other potentially conflicting objectives. In terms of our framework, it is 
undesirable for the government to play a dual role. It would be more desirable for 
the government to establish an independent agency that could be answerable to 
the parliament.  
 
There have been claims that the government has acted in the interests of 
government-linked companies (GLCs) rather than in the interest of optimising 
social welfare. Decisions such as this should be transparent and made solely in 
the interests of efficiency and productivity, but recent claims of improper 
interference in decision-making casts aspersions on the government ability to 
play the dual role of decision-maker and final arbitrator.9 There are several 
pertinent points that need to be raised at this juncture. First, we must bear in mind 
that the government has a responsibility to all its citizens and all stakeholders, 
rather than to the interests of particular stakeholders. We have argued that overall 
social welfare is the central concern, which means that overall welfare should 
stand ahead of the welfare of GLCs. 
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The lack of distinction between the government's role as a decision-maker and 
arbitrator resurfaces in the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA). 
MTEP was restructured in 1998 into the Ministry of Energy, Communications 
and Multimedia (MECM). The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia 
Commission (MCMC) were founded during this restructuring. Subsequent to the 
passing of the CMA, the MCMC is the regulatory authority for the 
telecommunications sector. The independence of this body is questionable 
because it seems to be unduly influenced by the government. Government's 
representation in the MCMC is overwhelmingly heavy; although there is only 
one member on the Commission who is a government representative, all other 
members are appointed by the Minister responsible for this portfolio. The 
appointment process was not transparent, and public input was not part of the 
process preceding appointment. The independence of any regulatory structure is 
of utmost importance. While final decisions will be made by the relevant 
minister, any regulatory body must constitute of members who do not seem to be 
unduly influenced by the government. Additionally, any advice proffered by a 
regulatory body should be made available to the public, even if it is to be 
eventually rejected by the government. This is essential in terms of our criteria 
for good institutional support, since transparency cannot be dispensed with. A 
careful examination of the MCMC will clearly indicate that these criteria are not 
abided with in spirit, even though the form of required institutional fabric seems 
to have been prepared. 
 
The CMA bestows extensive powers upon the Minister in matters relating to 
regulatory policies.10 The Minister of Energy, Communications and Multimedia 
acts on recommendations made by the MCMC and in turn directs the latter. The 
MCMC is a middle-level organisation that liaisons with industry forums and also 
interacts with the appeal tribunal. The Minister does not deal with industry 
operators directly, but only through mediation of the MCMC. The MCMC makes 
recommendations to the Minister and also has the responsibility of administering 
license applications, renewals and their issuance. Yet, the Minister has the final 
say in matters pertaining to licenses. This organisational structure leaves no doubt 
that the Ministry is the highest authority in industry regulation. There is no 
independent body that can receive appeals or arbitrate disputes when industry 
participants wish to contest a decision made by the Ministry or when there is a 
difference of opinion between competing firms. Similarly, there is a need for a 
regulatory body that can assess the operations of the various institutions under the 
government's umbrella, in addition to assessing the efficiency and welfare 
consequences of the government's decisions. One of the crucial responsibilities 
that an appropriate institutional structure must maintain is the conduct of 
feasibility studies on decisions, with a clear exhibition of associated costs and 
benefits, as well as opening these results for public discussion. This is completely 
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absent in the Malaysian context, and the MCMC is equally subject to these 
shortcomings.  
 
There is no doubt that there is room for public participation through the conduct 
of public inquiries. This is provided under the Communications and Multimedia 
Act (CMA) 1998. The MCMC has utilised provisions under the CMA to conduct 
public enquires, receive opinions from private operators and receive public 
feedback on the MCMC's discussion papers. Indeed, there is room for public 
participation within the regulatory structure that has been laid out, but the extent 
to which this feedback is incorporated within policy decisions is questionable 
because no independent agency exists to arbitrate between differing views. It 
cannot be denied that the regulatory structure as officially designed has channels 
for receiving public participation, but questions remain as to the extent that 
opposing views can be assimilated within the policy process. With the 
centralisation of powers in the hands of the government, there is a true need for 
an independent agency to evaluate the validity of differing views. Such an agency 
is not quite achievable under the present framework. Although MCMC is a 
statutory body with its own funding arrangements, the fact that it takes directives 
from the Minister of Energy, Communications and Multimedia must certainly 
restrict its capabilities. 
 
The CMA 1998 provides some regulatory framework despite its limitations. 
Indeed, this is not available in all areas of public policy. In this restricted sense, it 
is commendable that the CMA has distinguished four central areas for regulatory 
attention: consumer protection, economic regulation, technical regulation and 
social regulation. Perhaps the most significant regulatory objective that the CMA 
has undertaken is one that ensures an efficient communications and multimedia 
industry. The CMA proposes to do this by incorporating provisions against anti-
competitive behaviour. The MCMC has taken steps to ensure that the CMA's 
objective of establishing a competitive environment is achieved. Towards this 
end, it is significant that the MCMC has published guidelines on procedures and 
processes for addressing anti-competitive conduct. The importance of the 
MCMC's actions stands in stark contrast against the absence of any national 
policy or comprehensive legislation on anti-competitive practices. In this sense, 
the MCMC's recognition of the significance of competition policy and law and 
the dire need to address these issues is laudable. At the risk of digressing, it 
should be noted that attempts to improve the institutional infrastructure in 
Malaysia will require the institution of competition law and policy in all areas of 
commerce, rather than confining these issues to the communications and 
multimedia industries. 
 
The CMA 1998 is comprehensive in its coverage because it addresses crucial 
aspects of consumer protection, such as service quality, rate regulation and 
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universal service provision. However, the practice of rate regulation leaves much 
to be desired. While the CMA provides for a market-based approach to the 
setting of rates, it also permits the Minister to decide on tariffs. The provision of 
ministerial intervention overturns the attempt to set prices based on market 
signals, which disrupts attempts at achieving social welfare maximisation. 
Another interesting commitment that the CMA undertakes is to improve on the 
service quality and consumer needs. The act is dedicated to forming a Consumer 
Forum that addresses reasonable consumer demands.  
 
Other areas of regulation that the CMA is concerned with include technical 
regulation and social regulation. The question of social regulation relates to the 
social values that are considered to be at the core Malaysian culture, primarily 
relating to offensive content. Although the CMA does not allow for the direct 
interference of the Minister in this matter, there is no doubt that his indirect 
control will be at play since he is involved in the issuance of licenses. Technical 
regulation in the context of the CMA 1998 refers to spectrum assignment, 
numbering and electronic addressing and technical standards. The MCMC has an 
important role to play in these matters. While all of these steps are in the right 
direction, increased shareholder participation would be preferable, so that 
information is publicly disseminated and the government's influence is 
moderated. The last issue is perhaps the most sensitive and pressing. 
 
Institutional Reform: What Needs to be Done 
 
The improprieties that can be observed in the execution of privatisation indicate 
the importance of regulatory reform in Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). From 
the discussion on reform in telecommunications, we observe that wider-ranging 
institutional reforms are necessary. One of the key features of any institutional 
reform in Malaysia should include the establishment of a body that can contribute 
to this process. The flaws and the improprieties committed in the Malaysian 
privatisation experience should provide lessons on the areas for action. Some of 
the features that the organisation should incorporate include the following: 
 
i. Conducting studies on policy issues, especially those addressing the costs 
and benefits of policy actions. This is to ensure that intended government 
initiatives are supported by strong arguments and reliable statistical 
evidence.  
 
ii. Providing an avenue for public complaints and investigations. In the 
event of accusations of impropriety, this organisation can has the 
mandate to conduct independent inquiries. 
iii. Providing an avenue for promoting public awareness. This organisation 
can inform and disseminate information to the public on the cost-
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effectiveness and community benefits of projects. At the same time, the 
public will be invited to give their input and feedback. This will act as a 
counterbalance to vested interests trying lobby their views, and will also 
ensure that the larger interests of the community are served. 
 
iv. Acting to promote the government-community interface. An organisation 
such as this is meant to ensure that larger interests of the economy are 
served, and that communicating intentions and objections is a part of this 
process. 
 
The Australian Productivity Commission (PC) is a good example of an 
organisation that fulfils the requirements of the above-mentioned features11. Like 
the PC, a similar organisation can be established in Malaysia. The organisation 
should be independent and free to research the justifications for policies 
suggested by the government. The organisation should also have the freedom to 
investigate the performance of policies that have been undertaken. 
 
The proposed organisation may not have judicial or executive powers, but it 
should have a mandate to play an advisory role in structural reform. For instance, 
the organisation would conduct investigations in instances where preliminary 
evidence indicates improper conduct in the delivery of policies. The organisation 
can report its results to the parliament or make recommendations to the 
government on the basis of its findings. Similarly, this organisation, as a result of 
its studies, may find merit in introducing competition law and policy in the 
country. These suggestions can be made to the government.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The primary rationale for privatisation is based on the argument that privatisation 
increases efficiency. Thus, it is implied that welfare will be maximised with 
privatisation. Privatisation is undertaken to reduce government involvement in 
business, which is done to avoid the crowding-out of private sector investments 
and to reduce the costs of government intervention in business. However, the 
privatisation record in Malaysia shows that the government involved itself in 
business in different ways: it continued to intervene, but perhaps less directly.  
 
If the government had deliberated more careful on drawing an institutional 
framework that emphasised efficiency, transparency and good governance, it is 
possible that cronyism could have been curtailed. The Malaysian experience 
demonstrates the importance of soft issues, such as institutional reform, because 
'hard' outcomes are compromised when such issues are ignored. Although there 
was a need for privatisation, it should have been preceded by the establishment of 
appropriate institutional mechanisms. 
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It is not possible to calculate the income stream losses arising from the irregular 
execution of privatisation, which was caused by lack of information. There is no 
doubt that vested interests and the practice of crony capitalism would have 
effectively prevented the economy from achieving the highest possible level of 
welfare maximisation. If Malaysia has done well and achieved significant levels 
of growth, then it is very well possible that Malaysia might have done even better 
if it had planned for its institutional mechanisms and processes. The privatisation 
experience is one example of how such an opportunity was lost. 
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NOTES 
 
1  Rodrik (1999) emphatically observes, "institutions do not figure prominently in the training of 
economists." 
2  See Dee (2006) for an account of the institutional basis of microeconomic reform. 
3  This is discussed in greater detail in Nambiar (2006). 
4  See Dee (2006) for a discussion of these criteria. 
5  The Privatisation Action Plan is the outline that proposes how the PMP will be implemented. 
The PAP is a component of the PMP (http://www.epu.my/Bi/publi/ Private/part6.htm) 
6  The six categories of activities were: (i) flagships, (ii) easily privatisable Government majority-
owned entities, (iii) restructuring candidates, (iv) services, (v) minority or listed holdings, and 
(vi) new projects. 
7  The three stages of implementation were: (a) commercialisation, (b) corporatisation, and                
(c) divestiture.  
8  For a detailed treatment of the privatisation of the healthcare sector, see Chan, C. K. (1996, 
1997), Chan, C. K, Noorul, A. M., & Dzulkifli, A. R. (1997), and Jomo, K. S. (1995). 
9  The institutional considerations arising from the privatisation of the telecommunications 
industry and thereafter are to be found in Nambiar (2006). 
10  See Lee, C. (2004) for a discussion of the regulatory aspects of the telecommunications industry 
in Malaysia within the context of competition policy. 
11  For a discussion on the features and role of the Australian Productivity Commission, see 
Wonder (2006).  
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